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Policy instruments for implementing the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) mechanism operate within 
an orchestra of national contexts and policy mixes that affect the forest and other land sectors. 
How will policymakers choose between the myriad of options for distributing REDD+ benefits, 
and be able to evaluate its potential effectiveness, efficiency and equity (3Es) within the various 
institutional and governance structures a where such a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism is 
situated? This is a pressing issue given the results-based aspect of REDD+. We present here a 
three-element assessment framework for evaluating outcomes and performance of REDD+ 
benefit sharing mechanisms, using the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and equity: (1) the 
structures (objective and policies) of a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism; (2) the broader 
institutional and policy contexts underlying forest governance; and (3) outcomes of REDD+ 
including emissions reductions, ecosystem service provision and poverty alleviation. A strength 
of the assessment framework is its flexible design to incorporate indicators relevant to different 
contexts; this helps to generate a shared working understanding of what is to be evaluated in 
the different REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms (BSMs) across complex socio-political 
contexts. In applying the framework to case studies, the assessment highlights trade-offs among 
the 3Es, and the need to better manage access to information, monitoring and evaluation, 
consideration of local perceptions of equity and inclusive decision-making processes. The 
framework aims not to simplify complexity but rather, serves to identify actionable ways 
forward towards a more efficient, effective and equitable implementation and re-evaluation of 







The rules for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) were set 
at the Bonn conference in June 2015 and the Paris Agreement that emerged from the 21st 
Conference of the Parties in December 20151 has renewed the momentum for climate finance 
and affirmed REDD+ as a results-based payment mechanism. These are positive signals as 
countries continue to implement variations of REDD+ at national or sub-national levels. Over 
the past years of REDD+ readiness activities, it has become apparent that REDD+ policy 
implementation will consist of a mix of various policy instruments aiming at tackling the drivers 
of deforestation and forest degradation. Within this orchestra of instruments, there are those 
that aim to (i) change enabling conditions such as the definition and allocation of property rights 
or restructuring of ministries’ responsibilities, (ii) introduce incentive based policy instruments, 
such as payments for ecosystem services schemes and (iii) implement disincentive policies such 
as tightening and stronger enforcement of direct regulation.  
REDD+ incentives are designed to influence forest and land use behaviour to reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation by changing the relative values of economic costs and 
benefits from forest use (Börner and Vosti, 2013). Among the most pressing challenges of 
national scale REDD+ implementation is the question of benefit sharing, i.e. how monetary and 
non-monetary incentives, generated through the implementation of REDD+ policies and 
projects at different governance levels (national, subnational and local), can be distributed in 
an effective, efficient and equitable manner (Luttrell et al., 2013, Pham et al., 2013). As such, 
countries will have to tackle questions such as: how will the REDD+ incentives be determined 
across the different target groups, what are the instruments to be used for distribution, and how 
will the flow of incentives be monitored and performance measured?  
                                                 




Decision makers have choices to make between options for the design of a benefit sharing 
mechanism (BSM) for REDD+. How will they choose between the myriad of options for 
sharing or distributing REDD+ benefits, and be able to evaluate its potential effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity (3E) and the potential trade-offs between them? This is especially so with 
the various institutional means, structures and policy instruments within which such a REDD+ 
benefit sharing mechanism is situated.  Specific contextual conditions and existing policies add 
complexity to understanding how a BSM can be designed to support the desired REDD+ 
outcomes.  
The aim of this paper is to provide guidance to countries through an assessment framework and 
possible indicators that can be applied to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
implications of a particular BSM design. The purpose of the framework is to allow for a more 
systematic evaluation of the outcomes of a BSM and an assessment of its performance to 
feedback into improving its design as part of policy learning and adaptation. This paper first 
presents the structural flow of thee assessment framework, followed by theoretical 
considerations of the effectiveness, efficiency and equity criteria, and then elaborates on how 
the framework can be translated into country and case specific indicators which we draw from 
an analysis of case studies. By building on the case studies, we highlight two particular aspects 
of the proposed framework: i) its application as a tool to generate a common understanding for 
evaluating different REDD+ BSMs across complex socio-political contexts where policies, 
measures and institutional structures are changing at the same time, and ii) the flexibility of the 
design elements in the framework to capture both the economic and governance  aspects.  
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2 Conceptual framework  
2.1 Benefit Sharing Mechanisms in a policy mix for REDD+ 
The design of a benefit sharing mechanism is ideally based upon a set of predefined objectives. 
In the case of REDD+, primary objectives would be to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation and to increase forest restoration, and many REDD+ countries often have 
additional objectives such as to alleviate poverty and foster rural economic development. It is 
important to identify these policy objectives upfront as they form the benchmark for the 
assessment and because of the multiplicity of different objectives can lead to inevitable trade-
offs. 
We divide the assessment of a REDD+ BSM into three elements or components, 
acknowledging that in the reality of policymaking, these elements often overlap and are 
intertwined. However, for the sake of analysis, we divide the assessment into three elements 
involving: 1) the structures of a REDD+ benefit sharing policy instrument to meet its stated 
objectives; 2) existing and potential changes in the institutional and policy context factors 
underlying REDD+ and the BSM; and 3) the outcomes of the REDD+ policy mix including 
emissions reductions, poverty alleviation and economic development (see Figure 1). The 
different elements are discussed further in the following paragraphs.  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for assessing REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
In the first assessment element, we examine REDD+ BSMs as a performance based policy 
instrument2. The aim of positive incentive based policy instruments is to influence human 
                                                 
2  Here we follow Huppes (2001) and define policy instruments as structured activities aimed at changing other activities or 
behavior in society towards predefined objectives. 
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behaviour by providing benefits as a conditional reward for an activity or outcome as defined 
by the specific policy objectives (Börner and Vosti, 2013). REDD+ BSM can target land 
stewards directly through the distribution of incentives to motivate towards a change in 
behaviour away from deforestation or forest degrading activities or towards forest restoration, 
similar in principle to payment for environmental services (PES) schemes (Wunder 2015, Vatn 
2014). A BSM can also target lower level administrations in decentralized governments by 
providing incentives through intergovernmental fiscal transfers. A subset of these 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers is linked to environmental performance, so-called 
“Ecological Fiscal Transfers”. Ecological fiscal transfers have been implemented in Brazil and 
Portugal for biodiversity and forest conservation objectives (May et al., 2002, Schröter-
Schlaack et al., 2014), and are now also being considered as a possible instrument for REDD+ 
(Irawan et al. 2014, Mumbunan et al. 2012). Ideally, the intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
contribute to changing the behaviour of local government policy-making by compensating for 
the costs of, or rewarding forest conservation and sustainable forest management policies and 
activities. In case study 1, we examined the forest and land revenue redistribution policy 
instruments in Cameroon to assess its functionality in transferring revenues to the local level. 
In the second assessment element, a REDD+ BSM is only one instrument within a policy mix 
to reduce deforestation and degradation. In addition to the influence of REDD+ incentives on 
the motivation of land stewards and policymakers at different levels of government, there are 
institutional context factors that also affect the outcome of a REDD+ policy, such as 
institutional capacities and responsibilities at different government levels or existing property 
rights regimes. A REDD+ policy or intervention may be accompanied by changing institutional 
context factors, for example through capacity building and the rearrangement of institutional 
responsibilities, or the definition and enforcement of property rights. Thus, a policy mix for 
REDD+ BSM might include administrative measures and command and control regulation. 
Administrative measures may aim at establishing or changing responsibilities and capabilities 
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between different ministries or agencies at the same governance level. An example is the 
establishment of the world’s first ministerial-level REDD+ Agency in Indonesia in 2013 to act 
as a coordinating and implementing body on REDD+, which was dissolved merely 2 years later 
(under the Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 16/2015) to be integrated within a consolidated 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2015 as part of a government restructuring. Similarly, 
vertical governance responsibilities and capabilities between different governance levels from 
national to local may be (re)arranged, often in connection with decentralization processes. Case 
study 2 on the Forest Land Allocation (FLA) policy in Vietnam examined how the 
decentralization of forest rights and management also come with costs and burdens that affects 
the implementation of future policy instruments. Direct command and control regulation and 
enforcement may be needed, as example for the definition of new property rights such as carbon 
rights (Loft et al., 2015) or the enforcement of land use regulations. In the case of the latter, the 
decline of deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon from 27,000 sq km in 2004 to less than 
5,000 sq km in 2012 is largely attributed to changes in the Brazilian law enforcement strategy 
and related governance systems (Assunção et al., 2012, Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013). 
In the third assessment element, a REDD+ policy or intervention is also affected by, and 
affecting other sectoral or cross-sectoral policies such as agricultural development subsidies or 
low emissions development strategy. These policies have an indirect effect on the motivation 
and behaviour of land stewards, and government/administration of subnational governance 
levels. These effects have to be taken into account when assessing BSMs. These conditioning 
factors, socio-political, cultural, economic and environmental influences of behaviour change, 
are an important piece of the puzzle in assessing a REDD+ BSM. In case study 3, we examined 
how the national PES program in Vietnam is perceived by the local beneficiaries through the 





2.2 Performance assessment criteria 
We evaluate REDD+ benefit sharing as a policy instrument using a predefined set of criteria 
relating to effectiveness, efficiency (Turner and Opschoor, 1994; Michaelis, 1996; OECD, 
1997; Gunningham, 1998), and equity (Corbera et al., 2007; McDermott et al., 2012, Vatn et 
al., 2011).3   
 Equity is increasingly recognized as a key factor in achieving REDD+ or PES outcomes 
(Pascual et al., 2014, Sommerville et al., 2010). However, while indicators of effectiveness and 
efficiency can be more easily identified and agreed upon, equity is inherently relativistic 
(Ituarte-Lima, 2014) as equity perceptions are not universal but rather, depend on the specific 
context in which decisions about the distribution of resources are made, and the perceptions of 
the ‘subjects of equity’ or affected stakeholders (Konow, 2003, Schokkaert and Devooght, 
2003, Muradian et al., 2010, Ituarte-Lima et al., 2014). An assessment of equity will always be 
an expression of fairness perceptions of different stakeholders and reflect, in part, on the 
distributions of wealth, power and access to resources within the society. The fairness 
perceptions can nonetheless be categorized along a set of normative fairness principles and 
                                                 
3 Effectiveness relates to the impacts or performance of the instrument. It covers the contribution/the degree of a change in 
behaviour through the policy instrument that contributes to a defined policy objective (environmental, social or economic), 
i.e. the measured marginal benefits associated with a given instrument (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011; Lindhjem et al., 
2010; OECD, 2007; OECD, 1997). For REDD+ these would include reductions of carbon emissions from deforestation and 
degradation, enhanced provision of non-carbon ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation and 
increased economic development. 
“Efficiency relates to the extent to which an instrument enables a cost-effective achievement of policy objectives.  The 
administrative costs associated with the instrument to achieve a certain policy objective (Turner and Opschoor, 1994) can be 
assessed using a cost-benefit criterion (the marginal cost of implementing a given instrument should be less than its marginal 
benefit) and/or a cost-effectiveness criterion (the marginal cost of applying a given instrument should be as low as possible) 
(OECD, 2007)” (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011: 21). 
Equity can be divided in three dimensions. Distributive equity refers to the allocation of outcomes and their impacts on different 
stakeholders in terms of costs, risks, and benefits (Corbera et al., 2007, Proctor et al., 2008, Pascual et al., 2010, McDermott 
et al., 2012). Procedural equity, refers to participation in decision making and inclusion and negotiation of competing views 
(Brown and Corbera, 2003), classified by Vatn et al. (2011) as legitimacy of process. ‘Contextual equity’ (McDermott et al., 
2012) or ‘equity of access’ (Brown and Corbera, 2003) relates to the existing social conditions – the ways in which different 
actors in society are able to engage with and participate due to existing capabilities and external factors including information, 
communication and knowledge, and the way institutions operate at different scales. 
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evaluated in the implementation of the REDD+ policy or intervention. Examples of such 
normative fairness principles are a needs-based, merit-based or egalitarian distribution (Luttrell 
et al. 2013, Pascual et al. 2010). Yet, the feasibility of ensuring equity (with its multifaceted 
social dimensions) and its potential interactions and trade-offs with efficiency and effectiveness 
is still only an emerging field of study. While the links between equity and 
efficiency/effectiveness are still contested (Halpern et al., 2013), and also beyond the scope of 
this paper, lessons from PES and conservation practice suggest that equity can have significant 
positive feedback on program outcomes and legitimacy over the longer term (Gross-Camp et 
al., 2012, Pascual et al. 2014). At the same time, proper consideration, and prioritization of the 
different aspects, of equity in the design, planning and implementation of a REDD+ scheme 
will likely incur higher costs and increase complexity. How will REDD+ as a results-based 
payment scheme balance between these demands? This dichotomy will be further discussed 
when examining the results of the case studies.  
3 From concept to application: assessing BSM structure, context and outcome 
In this section, we illustrate how the three elements of the framework illustrated in Figure 1: (1. 
Design of a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism (objectives and policy instrument); 2. 
Institutional and policy contexts; 3. Outcomes (and motivations to achieve them)) can be 
measured with verifiable indicators. We first briefly describe the rationale and general 
characteristics, and use case studies to illustrate each element of the framework in the sub-
sections below. The first case study examines a national policy instrument or benefit sharing 
mechanism for the redistribution of forest and wildlife revenues in Cameroon to identify the 
structures and administrative measures for how revenues are delivered to the identified 
beneficiaries. The second case study examines institutional and policy contexts in the 
decentralization of rights to local communities through the national FLA (FLA) program in 
Vietnam, and assesses the multi-level governance practices within this decentralized system 
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and its impact on forest BSMs. The third case study examines the impacts of an incentive for 
forest conservation in the national Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) scheme in 
Vietnam on local beneficiaries, and in particular, assesses the local communities’ perceptions 
of equity and their motivation to protect and manage forests to achieve the PFES policy 
outcomes.  
Each of the case studies correspond to an element of the assessment framework and are part of 
a portfolio of studies carried out under the CIFOR REDD+ benefit sharing project4. Given the 
absence of full REDD+ implementation in any country, the case studies are chosen based on 
existing policy instruments in the forest sector to inform the design of REDD+ benefit sharing. 
The case studies illustrate how the assessment framework can be flexible to specific contexts 
in its potential application to REDD+, and how it can also be applied separately to assess 
specific elements of a national REDD+ program to derive policy lessons. 
3.1 Structures of policy instruments for REDD+ benefit sharing  
The first component of the framework is an analysis of how a given BSM performs as a policy 
instrument in terms of its administrative and organizational structures in the distribution of 
benefits to the target beneficiary groups. We examine how the benefits are being distributed 
through the policy instrument, i.e. the actors involved, the processes of distribution and decision 
making, and whether or not the selection of stakeholders and beneficiary groups match the 
predefined objectives of the instrument. The benefit sharing instrument is effective if the 
incentives or revenues reach the targeted stakeholders within a reasonable amount of time; 
efficient if incentives reach targeted stakeholders with least administrative and transaction 
                                                 
4 The CIFOR-led project “Opportunities and Challenges in implementing REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms in developing 
countries” (2012-2016) examined the issue of REDD+ benefit sharing in 6 countries and from various angles, from the 
study of economic costs and benefits of enabling forest policy options to the calculation of implementation and opportunity 
costs of REDD+ pilot initiatives, to assessing multi-level governance and decision-making on forests and land use, and to 
understanding how rights and tenure affect equity and preferences in benefit sharing. The plurality of studies called for a 
framework for consolidating the results in a cohesive manner for informed policy-making. www.cifor.org/redd-benefit-
sharing   
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costs; and equitable, if (i) relevant beneficiaries or stakeholders are represented, recognized, 
and are able to participate in decisions on criteria for how beneficiaries are identified, and the 
size, timing and type of benefits to be delivered; (ii) the share of incentives distributed among 
stakeholders adheres to an agreed fairness criterion; and (iii) if all potential stakeholders’ have  
the capacity to engage in the BSM.  
As Cameroon progressed in its policy discussions on REDD+, there was clear interest to build 
on existing institutional practices and policy instruments in the forestry and environment sectors 
(MINEPDED, 2013), although there were also divergence in opinions proposing a 
transformation or design of new instruments to fit the REDD+ regime (Somorin et al. 2013). 
Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2015) analyzed four types of revenue redistribution mechanisms, each 
with specific governance and institutional arrangements5: Annual Forest Fees, Council Forest 
Revenues, Wildlife Royalties and Community Forest Revenues to assess the functioning of 
these instruments and applicability to REDD+. The main objectives of the policy instruments 
are to support poverty reduction and local development of forest communities, which appear at 
least compatible to Cameroon’s objective for REDD+ as a development tool (MINEPDED, 
2013).  
Building primarily on Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2015), and extracting lessons from other studies 
assessing Cameroon’s forest and land taxation systems (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2013, Cerruti 
et al., 2010, Oyono et al., 2009), the “infrastructure” behind the revenue redistribution policy 
instruments is assessed following a defined set of criteria and indicators on the effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity effects, and presented in Table 1 below.  
                                                 
5  Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2015) assessed implementation of the revenue redistribution policy 
instruments based on a study of the legal and regulatory frameworks of the instruments (Ordinance No. 
74-1 of 6 July 1974 to Establish Rules Governing Land, and Law No. 94 of 20 January 1994 on Forestry, 
Wildlife and Fisheries Regulations), a review of official finance and tax statistics, and collected field 
data from 15 villages in four council areas who receive the forest revenues, namely Yokadouma 





Insert Table 1 here 
 
The studies are consistent in finding that the revenue redistribution instruments’ structure, 
targeting and distribution of benefits are ineffective, and highlights that design of the policy 
instruments reflect flaws in the existing institutional context factors. The policy instruments are 
not effective as the administrative processes at multiple government levels are overly complex, 
have cumbersome bureaucracy and lack proper accountability mechanisms that could support 
better financial governance. There is also evidence that suggests that all the revenue 
redistribution mechanisms have high transaction costs due to the opaque administrative 
processes, which hinders local communities from taking advantage of the presented 
opportunities and which also in part, enables rent capture by some forest and political elites 
(Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015; Lescuyer et al., 2015; MINFOF, 2013; Cerruti et al., 2010; 
Oyono et al., 2009). As a consequence, the development objectives of the policy instruments 
are largely unmet (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015; Cerruti et al., 2010; Oyono et al., 2009). 
Although the beneficiaries of forest revenues are defined by local ownership rights (such as 
community forests or commune forests) or by location to exploited forests, issues of inequitable 
distribution has been raised by those councils without forests or located next to protected areas, 
claiming that Cameroon’s forests belong to all Cameroonians (Cerruti et al., 2010; Oyono et 
al., 2009). Local communities, in turn, believe the distribution and utilization of the Annual 
Forestry Fee to be unfair and only contribute to increasing the wealth of the State, the mayors 
and local leaders (Oyono et al. 2009). Further, it can be argued that the lack of participation and 
inclusiveness in decision-making structures of the forest revenue redistribution policies has 
reinforced the historical marginalization of women and forest minorities such as the Pygmy 
groups (Topa et al., 2009; Assembe-Mvondo, 2006; Oyono, 2005). This is a problem that may 
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be repeated as forest dwelling communities continue to be sidelined in REDD+ processes 
(Dkamela et al., 2014). 
3.2 Wider institutional and policy contexts 
The second part involves an assessment of the institutional and policy contexts, including 
changes that might have taken place to either improve forest governance (e.g. policies or 
measures to increase enforcement or coordination across sectors), remove perverse incentives 
that drive deforestation behaviour, or involve devolution of rights to local managers (whether 
at level of local governments, communities or individual households); and how they are being 
implemented. Although such policy instruments may have been designed with the objective of 
improving overall forest governance, there may be both direct and indirect benefits and costs 
involved. Various institutional context factors exist, and they can have an effect on both the 
design of the policy instruments and well as their outcomes (Börner and Vosti, 2013). These 
factors “involve the basic institutions of a society, consisting in the formal and informal rules 
that govern society (economic, political, social institutions)” (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 
2011:15). Relevant factors for REDD+ BSM include: existing legal frameworks, particularly 
those relating to land and forest tenure and rights, the level of governance relative to the forest 
resources and BSM, operational structures and administrative capacity for the implementation 
and monitoring of the instrument, and the transaction and opportunity costs associated with the 
implementation of the instrument. These factors are obviously inter-linked and mutually 
reinforcing in various ways.  For the purpose of assessing one policy instrument within the mix, 
the institutional factors are effective if they enable/support implementation of the BSM through 
clear definition and enforcement of land and forest tenure and rights (and correspondingly, the 
relevant beneficiaries and stakeholders), established monitoring and data management capacity.  
It is efficient if achieved with least administrative costs and within the least amount of time. 
And it is equitable, if relevant stakeholders are enabled to, and actually participate in the 
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process. The distribution of responsibilities, costs and benefits both horizontally and vertically 
across different stakeholder groups are also an important equity criteria. 
The considerations of institutional context factors are applied to the case of forest rights in 
Vietnam (Table 2). Yang et al. (2016) 6 analyzed the FLA processes and decision-making at 
multiple levels from the subnational to the local to understand the contrasts and similarities 
between different governance arrangements and their impacts on effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity. The FLA program is aimed at devolving forest rights to local communities and 
individuals in order to encourage local forest protection and development in rural forested 
regions (Castella et al., 2006, Phuc et al., 2013, Trung at al., 2015). These rights are in turn a 
pre-condition for eligibility to incentives, such as Vietnam’s national Payment for Forest 
Environmental Services (PFES) and eventually REDD+ (Phuc at al., 2012). An important 
socio-political contextual factor that colors the FLA is the state dominance in forest land 
management under Vietnam’s centralized governance system, yet there have been 
discrepancies between provinces in its implementation (Clement and Amezaga, 2013, 2009). 
Decision-making processes and outcomes vary due to flexibility provided at the subnational 
level to implement national policies within their jurisdictions (Clement and Amezaga, 
2013).Building primarily on Yang et al. (2016), and extracting lessons from other studies 
examining different aspects of the FLA policy in practice (Clement and Amezaga, 2013, 2009, 
Phuc at al., 2012), the FLA as a contextual factor in the national PFES policy is assessed 
following a defined set of criteria and indicators on the effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
effects, and presented in Table 2 below. 
 
                                                 
6 The study by Yang et al. (2015a) conducted 100 key informant semi-structured interviews across 
multiple levels in two provinces Nghe An and Dien Bien, within two districts and four communes of 
each province. The sites at commune levels were identified due to the presence of incentive-based 
policy instruments (such as PFES and the national reforestation program), as well as those 
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The assessment results from the case study of two provinces in Vietnam indicate that despite 
some progress in allocating forest land to communities and households, the contextual factors 
underlying the FLA processes can be barriers for other forest policies and programs such as 
PFES. Overall efforts to promote forest and protection and development policy and can lead to 
inequity at various levels, whether within state agencies or between communities in different 
areas (Clement and Amezaga, 2009). While centralized policies, roles and responsibilities have 
been transferred to lower government (Trung et al., 2015), implementation has been uneven 
and the abilities to implement FLA varied depending in part on the different provinces’ 
objectives, capacity and political ideology (Yang et al., 2016, Clement and Amezaga, 2013, 
2009). The status across provinces, and communes, ranges from completed FLA with defined 
and secure rights, to incomplete FLA processes, to poor FLA practices with unclear land user 
rights. The allocation of forest land is based on field-based inventories of forest area, quality 
and type with the added challenge of identifying historical land users and is overall a resource 
heavy process. Inconsistent and poor quality forestry data often rendered FLA processes 
inadequate (Phuc et al., 2012). Under such conditions, efficiency of forest policy and programs 
are weakened, as often re-allocation is required as a result.    
The quality of FLA implementation has further consequences for equity and effectiveness of 
forest protection efforts, as allocations define eligibility for forest benefit sharing mechanisms 
such as PFES.  FLA process influences the amount of PFES payments as these are based on 
forest type and size, amongst other factors (Yang et al., 2016).  Findings (Pham et al., 2013, 
Phuc et al., 2012) indicated in some cases, the number of hectares allocated to households were 
so small that the small benefits provided by PFES would be impossible to compete with other 
more profitable opportunity costs., thus forcing forest land owners to accept lower returns. This 
perceived inequity is exacerbated as FLA is designed in part to stop shifting cultivation 
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(Clement and Amezaga, 2009), and its success in achieving this goal means transferring the 
burden to local communities who have long practiced shifting cultivation as their main 
livelihoods. This point highlights the link between FLA and the institutional and policy contexts 
and how its variable effectiveness has influenced the implementation of a BSM, shaping who 
can participate, how benefits are assigned and how it affects motivations towards forest 
protection. This highlights the link between how the institutional context of an enabling policy 
can have an indirect effect on the effectiveness of the BSM instrument, as discussed in 
following section. 
3.3 Impact on beneficiaries to achieve outcomes 
In the third part, we assess how the benefit sharing policy instrument can affect the motivation 
and behaviour of the target beneficiaries towards desired outcomes of changes in land and 
forest use behaviour. The instrument is effective if there are additional environmental, social or 
economic benefits gained relative to the policy objective. It is efficient if the policy objectives 
are achieved with least marginal costs, and it is equitable if incentives, costs and risks are being 
distributed according to an agreed fairness criterion (equality, merit, need, libertarian), and if 
beneficiaries have the opportunity to participate in decisions over how benefits are delivered 
and freedom of choice on how to use them.PES and REDD+ are envisioned as performance-
based incentives to influence the economic considerations of costs and benefits related to 
individuals’ decisions to engage in forest and land use behaviour. Individuals are not motivated 
by economics alone however; individual perceptions of fairness and legitimacy (Sommerville 
et al. 2010, van Noordwijk et al. 2012, Pascual et al. 2014), social norms (Kinzig et al. 2013) 
and the broader institutional and organization environment (Getnet et al. 2014) can also have 
substantial impacts on the participation of both the individual and wider community and thus 
the efficacy of an intervention. 
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Building primarily on Yang et al. 2015) and Pham et al. (2014), and extracting lessons from 
other studies examining different aspects of the PFES in Vietnam (Phuc et al., 2012), we 
examined the local motivations to achieve outcomes of PFES, a national policy instrument to 
compensate or reward local forest owners for protecting the forests. PFES is designed as a 
results-based mechanism to improve management of forests, increase forest area and quality, 
and improve social wellbeing of the local people. This case study is an extension of the previous 
section on multi-level governance in forest land allocation processes in Vietnam by looking in 
particular at the local beneficiaries’ perception of equity with regards to the payments and how 
this can potentially effect motivation and behaviour towards forest management and 
protection7. The PFES outcomes at the local level are assessed following a defined set of criteria 
and indicators on the effectiveness, efficiency and equity effects, and presented in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The assessment of PFES outcomes in Vietnam finds that socio-cultural norms, economic 
drivers and trust in the local governance structure at the local-scale strongly colour perceptions 
of equity and behaviour change. In particular, the assessment framework allows for the 
identification of structural and design aspects of the PFES policy instrument that will require 
further improvement in how benefits or payments are distributed. The assessment findings 
indicate that the current approach to PFES distribution overlooks the needs of local people and 
                                                 
7 Pham et al. (2014) suggest that local people’s preferences for how revenue from PFES is distributed 
and used, and their ability to influence decisions in how the revenues are spent, can shape the 
scheme’s effectiveness in achieving forest management and poverty reduction goals. Two similar 
studies examined this issue using data gathered from focus group discussions, village head surveys 
and household interviews (Pham et al. 2014 interviewed 124 households in three communes in Son 
La province; Yang et al. 2015 interviewed 179 households in four communes in Dien Bien province).  
The two studies come to a similar conclusion in that decisions for how the PFES revenues are spent 
or distributed are in part shaped by the perceived trustworthiness and capability of village authorities, 
by the level of funds received, and by local definitions of “equity”. 
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in certain cases, result in inefficient use. When the small revenue streams are divided equally 
amongst all households, high transaction costs of distribution and ineffectiveness of the small 
amounts of finances will likely lower motivations to manage or protect the forest (Phuc et al., 
2012; Yang et al. 2015). Although the approach of equal payments meets the local interpretation 
of ‘equity’, as perhaps informed by socialist beliefs, it overlooks other important aspects of 
what may be considered as fair (Luttrell et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2014; Yang et al. 2015,). For 
example, other local interpretations of equity within communities in the case study include 
adjusting the payments based on efforts, thus those who engage in forest protection activities 
should receive higher payments as compensation; or to account for past achievements made by 
individual land and forest managers in providing ecosystem services. Where there is lack of 
trust in the local governance structure however, the preference for equal payments is 
particularly strong to avoid possibility of elite capture (Pham et al., 2014).  There is also a 
certain level of perceived inequity and ineffectiveness when substantive amounts of PFES funds 
are directed towards state-owned plantations holding large areas of forests. Inequity is also 
perceived in the transference of costs and burdens: one point is tied to the broader institutional 
context where the ecosystem service buyers (hydropower and water utility companies) simply 
pass on the cost of having to pay into the national PFES fund by increasing the rates to their 
customers in their utility bills (Pham et al. 2014, Yang et al. 2015). Another point of contention 
where the FLA’s success in stopping shifting cultivation is perceived as a burden or cost 
transferred to local people with the low PFES payments as inadequate or unfair compensation. 
4 Discussion of results 
The evaluation of a policy instrument for distribution of incentives to motivate policies and 
behaviour towards forest management and protection is a challenge as it is situated within two 
complex interlinked spheres: the first sphere is that of institutional factors, governance and 
policy instruments for forest governance; and the second is the local socio-cultural-political 
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contexts that underlie human behaviour and actions. The challenges in being able to assess 
attribution of different design features of an incentive policy instrument to outcomes of 
behaviour change in reducing deforestation and forest degradation are apparent as it is often 
difficult to understand exactly what affects change within the complex constellation of 
interlinked institutional and policy factors, and contextual conditions. This is a weakness of the 
assessment framework. It presents a somewhat stylized structure with three clearly 
differentiated components of a policy process that in reality often overlap, are intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing, as is seen in the case studies 2 and 3 of Vietnam. The inability to parse 
out a direct pathway from policy to output has clear implications for the results-based payment 
approach of REDD+. Policies and policy implementation however are influenced strongly by 
historical and contextual factors, and a strength of the framework is thus in identifying 
obstructionist factors to be addressed – factors that hinder larger, transformational change in 
economic, regulatory, and governance frameworks that are required to actually realize a 
REDD+ agenda (Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012, Di Gregorio et al. 2012).  
In applying our assessment framework to case studies in Vietnam and Cameroon, we gain 
insights into the critical importance of how the effectiveness, efficiency and equity aspects of 
an incentive-based policy instrument or benefit sharing mechanism is shaped by institutional 
contextual factors and socio-political norms, and identifies areas where improvement is 
required. In the case of the forest and wildlife revenue redistribution policy instrument in 
Cameroon, effectiveness, efficiency and equity outcomes are constrained by heavy 
bureaucracy, lack of transparency and low participation, resulting in high transaction costs, 
perceived inequity and few lasting benefits for the local communities. A future mechanism for 
REDD+ benefit sharing in Cameroon has to avoid duplicating or reinforcing the procedural and 
governance flaws identified in the assessment of the existing revenue redistribution 
instruments. Possible solutions might include  a multi-stakeholder approach to identifying the 
different risks to a REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism and what would be adequate safeguards 
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will be critical to the credibility of the policy process and one avenue to support stronger 
governance and management (Brockhaus et al. 2014). In this case, the assessment framework 
highlights that the policy instrument is a reflection of its institutional context – and in order to 
achieve an effective, efficient and equitable revenue redistribution instrument, there may need 
to be reforms in the institutional context as well. 
The forest land allocation (FLA) process in Vietnam is characterized by a mis-match in the 
governance  and decision-making on forest use and management at multiple levels, low 
capacity and poor quality data and monitoring, resulting in delayed benefits, a sense of inequity 
between state agencies and local people, and unclear boundaries between forests and other land 
uses. The assessment highlights areas in the institutional context factors to be addressed. First 
is to understand the differences in political interests and goals between the central and lower-
level governments. While decentralization often leads to ‘flexibility’ or variation in governance 
practices (Trung et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2016), assessing how objectives of a policy instrument 
at central level can be translated into local goals is critical for achieving the policy outcomes. 
Findings from the case study assessment clearly demonstrate a need for guidance and resources 
to implement ‘good practices’ of FLA (associated with increased participatory and 
comprehensive land assessment processes). This might include training, capacity and budget to 
the district, commune and village levels of government, and to customary leaders who are often 
marginalized in such policy processes. Good practices of FLA were perceived by lower levels 
of government to engender improved forest management practices, in particular through 
reduced shifting cultivation and increased restoration of forests. More importantly, good FLA 
practice appears to be strongly correlated with a more equitable contextual condition for policy 
instruments such as PFES and REDD+.  
The third case study of PFES program in Vietnam highlighted the challenges of ensuring that 
a forest incentive will actually lead to desired outcome and behaviour change at the local level 
given the complexity of socio-cultural norms and local governance practices driving equity 
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perceptions and inadequacy of the incentive relative to economic costs incurred. For example, 
while local governments perceive FLA to be a success in restricting shifrting cultivation (a 
long-practiced land use in uplands of Vietnam), local people perceive this as a heavy burden 
when on their livelihoods particularly with little compensation from low PFES payments (Pham 
et al., 2013). These issues relating to lack of a fair rewards structure and simple transfer of costs 
and responsibilities from utility companies to local forest land owners  or national achievements 
at the expense of local burdens must be addressed adequately through a legitimate and inclusive 
process of assessing local needs and preferences, or social motivation to manage and protect 
forests would simply be lost.  
Our assessment highlights the challenges of how a REDD+ policy could achieve its desired 
outcomes – and the implications for a results-based payment approach.  If REDD+ financing is 
to be allocated at the country-level as appears to be the case in recent years through development 
aid budgets (Angelsen, 2013), this means that countries will have to bear the costs and risks of 
non-performance. In our study, this assessment framework provides a practical approach to 
identify factors that hinder or constrain performance as part of a policy learning and adaptation 
process. 
5 Conclusions: Identifying solutions within a complex policy mix 
The design of a benefit sharing mechanism would ideally follow on from having first specified 
REDD+ objectives and taking into account contextual institutional and policy factors to come 
up with policy instruments that deliver the REDD+ benefits to targeted beneficiaries. 
Policymaking however rarely follows such sequential steps. In applying the assessment 
framework to the three case studies of forest policy instruments, there are clear trade-offs 
between effectiveness, efficiency and equity – and issues of managing transparency, enabling 
access to information, implementing robust monitoring and evaluation systems, considering 
local perceptions of equity and building inclusive decision-making processes appear to be key 
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pieces to the 3E puzzle. These are useful lessons for the design of a REDD+ benefit sharing 
mechanism. Being able to connect a benefit sharing mechanism or policy instrument to the 
institutional context factors that would influence its design and the conditional factors that 
influence outcomes – and to have a set of criteria and indicators for assessing how the three 
elements interconnect is one step towards a more holistic approach to policy making.    
Hence, while complexity is a challenge, it cannot be an excuse for inaction. Reflexivity in policy 
appraisal or assessment provides space to consider the plurality of opinions or options, and in 
so doing, exposes the underlying values, interests and subjective assumptions to critical 
reflection (Howard et al., 2015). The assessment framework provides an approach to 
(re)consider what alternative policy pathways may be possible and to assess their equity 
implications of who benefits and who pays the costs, by capturing this complexity and 
providing flexibility in its design and use of appropriate indicators to the 3E criteria. In doing 
so, it can generate a common understanding of what needs to be assessed, how this can be done 
systematically, and offers guidance on how to interpret findings and identify actionable ways 
forward towards a more efficient, effective and equitable implementation and re-evaluation of 
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Table 1: Indicators used in the assessment of a benefit sharing policy instrument: Cameroon’s 
forest and wildlife revenue redistribution mechanisms (Assembe-Mvondo et al. 2015, 2013, 
Cerruti et al., 2010, Oyono et al., 2009) 
Criteria Definition of criteria 
as applied to an 
assessment of the 
policy instrument 
infrastructure  





is effective if the 
incentives reach the 
targeted stakeholders 
within reasonable time 
• Reaches targeted 
stakeholders 






• The beneficiaries of the 
mechanisms are clearly 
identified – State at the 
central level, councils, and 
local communities.  
• The administration for 
redistribution of funds 
involves multiple 
procedures at both national 
and regional levels, 
resulting in long and 
complex processes. 
• The frequency and size of 
payments were uncertain, 
with some councils and 
local communities not 
receiving the annual 
revenues in several years. 
 
Efficiency The incentive 
distribution mechanism 
is efficient if the 




within least amount of 
time.  In case of 
Cameroon, efficiency 
refers to the transaction 
costs8:  








• Time taken to 
distribute benefits 
to stakeholders 
• Cost of 
implementing the 
policy 
• Cost of receiving 
the revenue 
• Monitoring and 
evaluation in place 
• A significant amount of 
funds were “lost” during 
the redistribution process 
indicating high inefficiency 
and evidence of fraud.  
• High transaction costs 
related to complicated 
bureaucratic processes 
hinders councils and local 
communities from taking 
advantage of the 
opportunities. 
• High costs related to 
distance from beneficiaries 
to the revenue 
redistribution 
administration. 
                                                 
8 Assembe-Mvondo et al. 2015; Cerruti et al., 2010  
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• costs connected to 
the bureaucracy. 
• Sizeable share of funds are 
put into support of 
management committees, 
which is another layer of 
institutional structures. 
• Funds were often not 
wholly used for the 




Equity The process of revenue 
distribution is equitable 
if: 
• beneficiaries are 
represented, 
recognized, and 





on size, timing and 
type of benefits 









• all potential 
stakeholders’ 







according to the 
objectives 
• Benefits reach the 
targeted groups and 
fit their defined 
criteria 








• targeting criteria 
• investment of 
benefits 
• access to 
information 
• transparency 
• the timing and 
type of benefits. 
• Beneficiaries are identified 
based on clear criteria and 
objectives, although there 
is a call for wider inclusion 
to all regions (with or 
without forests)) on basis 
Cameroon’s forest as a 
national good. 
• Concern that revenues 
from forest taxes only 
benefit the state and local 
elites.  
• Participation in decision-
making processes is 
managed by, and largely 
limited to village- or 
council-level organizations 
or management 
committees with limited 
participation – much of the 
power is concentrated with 
the local authorities (e.g. 
mayors).   
• Marginalized groups 
(women, minorities) are 
under-represented in the 
decision-making 
committees. 
• Low access to information 
and uncertainty regarding 
shares of payments. 
• There is lack of 
accountability in how 
funds are 
allocated/managed. 
• The types of benefits that 
were provided with the 








Table 2. Indicators used in the assessment of institutional context factors: the multi-level 
governance in Vietnam’s Forest Land Allocation (FLA) (Clement and Amezaga, 2009, 2013, 
Phuc et al., 2012, Yang et al., 2016) 




Indicators Assessment findings 
Effectiveness Change of institutional 
factors is effective, if 
they enable/support 
the implementation of 
the BSM, e.g. property 
rights defined/clarified 
and enforced, 
monitoring and data 
management capacity 
built up. 
• Property rights 
(carbon and land 
tenure defined) 





shifted (within and 
across governance 
levels) 
• Number of trained 
government staff 
• Clear rules/guidance 
• Monitoring and 
evaluation in place 
• Mis-match between 
central and local level 
government politics and 
policy goals leads to 
uneven and variable 
policy implementation. 
• FLA processes vary 
across sites, ranging from 
complete to incomplete 
to poor and sometimes 
requiring a process of re-
allocation. 
• Forest policy and 
administration is in place, 
but difficult to implement 
due to capacity, man 
power and financial 
constraints. 
• Unreliable (poor quality) 
forest data, lack of 
monitoring of FLA 
process leads to conflicts 
and possible reallocation 
of land. 
• FLA is considered 
effective when restricting 
shifting cultivation is 
reduced and increasing 
reforestation increased. 
Efficiency Change of institutional 
factors is efficient, if 
achieved with least 
administrative costs, 
within in the least 
amount of time. 
• Amount of $ to 
reach above 
mentioned 
• Time needed 
• Cost of 
implementing forest 
policy, at different 
governance levels 
• Incomplete and poor FLA 
has caused delay in getting 
the benefits from PFES. 
• A proper FLA is time 
intensive but this was 
considered complete and 
legitimate in case study 
sites relative to other 
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 related land policies and 
programs. 
• Monitoring activities are 
inefficient leading to poor 
data and delaying FLA 
processes  
Equity Change of institutional 
factors is equitable, if 
relevant stakeholders, 
especially from 
affected sectors are 
enabled to, and 
actually participate in 
the process, and those 
changes with 
distributional effects, 
such as definition/ 
clarification of 
property rights, adhere 




• Level of 
participation across 





n of property rights 





• Good practices of FLA are 
associated with 
participatory processes 
with local government to 
identify ownership 
through historical use. 
• Equity in FLA involved 
dividing land equally 
among community 
members following 
egalitarian and libertarian 
principles 
• Inequity persists, the state 
still manages the majority 
of good quality forest 
while local people manage 
mostly poor quality 
forests. 
• As the State manages 
protected forest, 
households can engage 
only through sub-
contracts often leading to 
very small shares of the 
benefits and for short one 
year contracts. 
• Effectiveness of FLA in 
stopping shifting 
cultivation is considered 
as a burden by local 




Table 3. Indicators used in the assessment of outcomes: Local behavior change from PFES 
program in Vietnam (Pham et al., 2014, Phuc et al., 2012, Yang et al., 2015) 
Criteria Criteria as applied to 
the assessment of 
outcomes at the local 
level 
Indicators Assessment findings 
Effectiveness The policy instrument 
is effective in terms of 
outcomes, if the 
• Reaches objective 
of reduced poverty, 
increased forest 






or economic benefits 
associated with the 
given instrument 
objective are higher 
than alternative policy 
instruments 
protection and 
reduced state budget 
to cover forest 
protection activities 
• Coordination of 
benefits distribution 
and actions  
• Monitoring results 




• Compliance and 
enforcement 
action in forest 
protection. 
• High opportunity costs 
from competing land 
uses are a major 
constraint to sustained 
forest protection 
behavior.  
• Lack of a functioning 
monitoring and 
evaluation system to 
measure effectiveness. 
• Where forest land 
allocation processes were 
considered legitimate, 
this was perceived to 
have positive outcomes.  
• Large PFES payments to 
state owned companies 
with large forest areas 
may be ineffective. 
• Generate significant 
funding for state agencies 
to invest in forest 
protection. 
Efficiency The instrument is 
efficient in terms of 
outcomes, if the policy 
objectives are 
achieved with least 
marginal costs.  
• Level of benefits vs. 
level of efforts/costs 
• Ratio of $ put in vs. 
measures of 
reaching target or 
objective 
•  Small amount of 
payments divided equally 
to households that are 
spread across large 
groups are not efficient. 
• A certain percentage of 
PFES funds are allocated 
to enable administration 
of the funds. 
Equity The instrument is 
equitable in terms of 
outcomes if 
incentives, costs and 
risks are being 
distributed according 




beneficiaries have the 
freedom of choice on 
how to use benefits 
• Level of benefits 
and costs distributed 
• Freedom of choice 
in how to use 
benefits  
• Local preferences are 
not captured in the 
distribution of PES 
revenues. 
• Trust in local 
governance is a concern 
in how local equity is 
perceived. 
• Lack of local 
participation in decision-
making.  
• Revenues are unpaid in 
some cases due to 
incomplete FLA.  
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• Equality sharing of 
revenues do not 
necessarily equate to 
equity and can 
disenfranchise those 
who put in more effort 
into forest management 
and protection. 
• The shared revenues are 
too small compared to 
efforts put in and 
opportunity costs 
incurred. 
• Lack of an effective 
grievance mechanism do 
not allow for conflicts to 
be voiced. 
 
 
